http://www.lrp-cofi.org/TWU100/trackdiv_election.html

LRP Supporter Wins Transit Union Post

In June, track worker Eric Josephson was elected Vice-Chair of the Track Division in Transport Workers Union Local 100, the powerful union of New York City’s subway and bus workers. Josephson is well-known in the union as a consistent fighter for workers’ interests. He is also widely known for his revolutionary socialist views and his support of the League for the Revolutionary Party and the newsletter it sponsors, Revolutionary Transit Worker.

Josephson’s election campaign literature highlighted immediate demands of struggle for track and all transit workers such as the fight for safe working conditions, preparations for the upcoming contract struggle and for democracy in the union. It also prominently championed revolutionary socialism as the alternative to increasing misery under capitalism and raised a perspective of union action over a range of issues from racist police brutality and anti-immigrant attacks to the imperialist occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Josephson won election to the same post previously, in 2000, running against both the old-guard bureaucracy and the “New Directions” caucus which at the time had a reputation among the ranks as a militant opposition. This time Josephson did not face competition from other opponents of the incumbent leadership. His electoral victory by a 2-to-1 margin over a supporter of incumbent Local President Roger Toussaint certainly expressed a protest by many against Toussaint’s betrayal of the union’s 2005 strike and his increasingly dictatorial rule over the Local. But it also indicated the support Josephson enjoys as a well-known fighter against the bosses and the willingness of many to back his proposals for action.

http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20080807a8.html

Thursday, Aug. 7, 2008

Police: JR West chief at fault over deadly Hyogo train crash
KOBE (Kyodo) West Japan Railway Co. President Masao Yamazaki should be held criminally negligent in connection with the deadly 2005 derailment in Amagasaki, Hyogo Prefecture, of a commuter train, police will tell prosecutors, according to investigative sources Wednesday.

Police are expected to send prosecutors reports on 10 JR West officials, including Yamazaki, 65, in September at the earliest. The reports are expected to recommend that several of the officials face similar charges.

Suggesting someone "deserves to be held criminally responsible" is the second-strongest opinion police can attach to such papers to prosecutors, following the demand for "stern punishment."

The Kobe District Public Prosecutor's Office will determine whether it can build a criminal case against the officials after receiving the papers from police.

They have been questioning Yamazaki since late July on suspicion of professional negligence resulting in death. They sought to learn the level of operational safety he was enforcing at the time the seven-car rapid-service train jumped the tracks on a curve on the JR West Fukuchiyama Line and plowed into a high-rise, killing 106 passengers and the driver and injuring more than 500.

By Robert Emery Bionaz.

Editor's note - The opinions of the author do not necessarily agree with or endorse the views expressed on our site. We include the article as an example of class struggle among transport workers.

In the first decade of the twentieth century, organized labor in San Francisco exercised "more power and influence than labor in any other major American metropolitan area."[1] The year 1901 saw the formation of the Union Labor Party (ULP), a political party which ostensibly represented the interests of the city's workingmen. In November of that year, Eugene Schmitz was elected mayor of San Francisco on the Union Labor ticket, "carrying three ULP supervisors with him."[2] Schmitz was re-elected on the same ticket in 1903, and the party captured two of eighteen seats on the Board of Supervisors.[3] In 1905, the party achieved virtual control of the city and county government, as Mayor Schmitz was re-elected and all eighteen members of the Board of Supervisors were elected on the Union Labor ticket.[4]

At this time, with the city considered a "closed shop" town and labor firmly in control of its political machinery, circumstances began to change. Between 1905 and the street railway strike of May 1907, an earthquake, charges of corruption against the mayor and almost all the supervisors, and a struggle for political control between local reform elements and controlling labor interests changed San Francisco politics. As a result of the political changes, the street railway strike became open warfare, split the city along class lines, and represented a battle for the "open shop" in the strongest labor town in the country.

Historians' studies of Progressive Era politics reveal the extent of San Francisco's unique political character during the period. Organized labor was not a dominant national political force during the first decade of the twentieth century. Michael Kazin in the Barons of Labor describes organized labor's condition in turn-of-the century America as being "known for its weakness," unable to surmount the "twin obstacles of the nation's individualist creed, and the multiple ethnic, occupational, and regional divisions among workers themselves."[5] Cognizant of organized labor's political weakness, labor leaders like American Federation of Labor (AFL) President Samuel Gompers eschewed political activity. During the first decade of the twentieth century, in response to labor's political weakness and Gompers' view that organized labor should avoid partisan politics, the AFL developed the concept of "voluntarism," which according to Melvyn Dubofsky in The State and Labor in Modern America, sought to keep labor unions out of politics by emphasizing that they "were totally private, voluntary institutions which sought nothing from the state."[6] Although membership in unions affiliated with the AFL grew dramatically between 1897 and 1903, labor's political position remained quite tenuous-it operated on the periphery of political power as a special interest group.[7] American business interests were supported by governmental institutions in their struggle against organized labor. As Dubofsky points out, employers waged bloody battles with even the most "responsible" and "conservative" of trade unions . . . American business never willingly conceded any of its prerogatives to workers and unions or to political reformers.[8]

At the beginning of the twentieth century, even "responsible" labor unions faced well-organized political opposition. President Theodore Roosevelt, despite his intercession in the 1902 strike in Pennsylvania's anthracite coal fields, was not sympathetic to the demands of organized labor-as Dubofsky emphasizes, Roosevelt was a strong supporter of the open shop:

Roosevelt's concept of labor-capital relations hinted at both promise and peril for trade unionists. On the one hand, he recognized the legitimacy of labor organizations as well as business corporations and encouraged employers to negotiate with representatives of their workers. On the other hand, however, he . . . praised individualism, pledging to defend the individual nonunion laborer from the tyranny of union bosses.[9]

On the national level, organized labor could expect neither sympathy nor support from the occupant of the White House.

Another obstacle to the development of the political power of organized labor was the hostility of the federal judiciary-as Dubofsky states, "overall, the most important judicial rulings went against workers and their unions."[10] The majority of federal judges relied on the injunction to enjoin "unions from using their most effective weapons of industrial warfare (strikes, picketing, and boycotts)," and, in their decisions, they "applied the brakes to labor frequently and hard."[11]

Organized labor responded to the lack of support from the White House and the animus of the judiciary by "developing a mode of political action most suitable to the needs of unionism."[12] The biggest obstacle to political action was the political split of the rank-and-file membership among Republican, Democratic, and Socialist parties. Confronted with this partisan split as well as with demands from "city centrals and state federations of labor . . . [for] the creation of an American labor party," the AFL had to devise a "political strategy to mollify rank-and-file demands for independent action while causing the least dissension."[13] In practice, labor's politics created "an ever tighter alliance," between Gompers and the Democratic party, and resulted in "a more positive opinion of state regulation of the economy and society."[14]

Kazin's view of national labor politics differs from Dubofsky's. He rejects the notion that unions were "the business organizations of the wage earners," and argues that "the labor movement was a significant political force in many American cities and industrial towns during the twentieth century."[15] Early twentieth-century workers had not left "their militant idealism behind in the Gilded Age," but had "updated it and challenged the right and ability of urban elites to rule."[16] Despite his differences with Dubofsky, Kazin acknowledges that there were definite constraints on organized labor's ability to achieve its political goals:

Unions must repeatedly establish their right and prove their ability to

represent working people in a nation where individual liberty, self-reliance, and the promise of social mobility are honored above all other civic values.[17]

However, labor's position in national politics was not replicated in San Francisco. Kazin estimates that ten percent of the nation's wage earners belonged to AFL unions in 1904. In contrast, more than one-third of San Francisco's work force was unionized. This created "an anomaly that either impressed or horrified contemporaries."[18] Contrary to labor's national position, San Francisco labor organizations "wielded significant power over working conditions and elected officials."[19]

There is a general consensus between Kazin and Robert Knight about the reasons for labor's unusual political influence in San Francisco. Kazin sees four major factors:[20]

1. Craftsmen and laborers were in an advantageous position because San Francisco was the pioneering urban society in the Far West; geographic isolation "made it difficult for employers to secure a supply of strikebreakers, and the lack of an entrenched governing class facilitated workers' forays into politics."
2. Small businessmen had not forged a "unified policy of hostility to

   organized labor."

3. The San Francisco business elite was fragmented ideologically.
4. In a city with a relatively homogenous white population and an absence of neighborhoods limited to one nationality, class identification was more important than ethnic identification.[21]

Knight's analysis includes two other important reasons:

1. "The character of leadership of the labor movement and the business community," and

2. "The political potency of the working-class vote."[22]

Despite the many advantages possessed by unions in San Francisco, including a strong presence in city politics, the 1907 streetcar strike ended in failure for the striking union. Knight and Kazin briefly discuss the strike in their works, focusing on the event as a battle between labor and business over the open shop. Neither pay more than scant attention to the impact of local politics on the dispute, although Kazin concedes that "the desperate tenor of the streetcar strike owed much to the unsettled condition of municipal politics."[23] This brief historical treatment of the strike has left unanswered questions. How did San Francisco politics change between 1905 and 1907? Why was the strike so unsuccessful in an ostensibly pro-labor town? How did local politics impact the strike?

In 1903, John Mitchell wrote in his book, Organized Labor, that the "trade union movement in this country can make progress only by identifying itself with the State."[24] The political conditions in San Francisco during the first decade of the twentieth century seemed to substantiate Mitchell's view. Growing out of a bloody strike in 1901, the Union Labor Party (ULP) achieved control of the city government by 1905. But at its inception the party had not enjoyed the official support of organized labor. In 1901, the two largest union organizations in San Francisco, the San Francisco Labor Council (SFLC), and the Building Trades Council (BTC), split ranks when the BTC forbade its members to hold membership in the SFLC.[25] Originally, neither labor organization endorsed the ULP, but by 1905, they joined together in support of the party against a Democratic-Republican "fusion" ticket which was portrayed as being anti-labor.[26]

Labor union membership grew concurrently with the growth of the ULP. Between 1901 and 1903, the number of unions affiliated with the SFLC increased from ninety-eight to one hundred thirty. By 1903, labor union membership in the city totalled an estimated 50,000, including 15,000 workers in unions affiliated with the BTC.[27] In San Francisco, organized labor seemed to be politically ascendant; in the words of Ray Stannard Baker, "the ancient master, the employer, has been hope-lessly defeated and unionism reigns supreme."[28]

One of the SFLC unions born during this heady expansion period was local 205 of the Amalgama-ted Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees of America (the Carmen's Union). The Carmen's Union was "furtively organized" in 1901 by streetcar men who had worked "in abject servility under a perfect system of espionage."[29] In 1901, the streetcar men worked for the Market Street Railroad, headed by E. P. Vining. In 1902, this railroad was purchased and merged into the United Railroads Company of San Francisco. Vining was retained as general manager by the president of the United Railroads, Patrick Calhoun. No matter who owned the road, relations between the Carmen's Union and the railroad remained stormy.

Several disputes between the union and the railroad occurred between 1902 and 1907. On 19 April 1902, the carmen struck for the reinstatement of thirty-five discharged union members, and a reduction in daily work hours from eleven and a half to ten. This strike had the support of all the San Francisco newspapers as well as public sympathy. Mayor Eugene Schmitz refused to grant weapons permits to the special guards the company had hired to protect the streetcars, or to provide police protection for the streetcars, making a strikebreaking effort futile. On 26 April, Vining negotiated terms with the union which resulted in a complete labor victory. Working hours were reduced to ten a day, the daily wage of $2.50 was retained, and all discharged union members were rehired. Although the union had not won recognition, the company signed an agreement pledging not to discriminate against its members and obligating management to meet with union grievance committees.[30]

In March 1903, conflict loomed again as the union demanded the nine-hour day, a wage increase to $3 a day, and the closed shop. Even within organized labor, however, the 1902 level of support for the carmen did not exist. Especially problematic was the closed shop issue. The Labor Clarion, the publication of the San Francisco Labor Council, urged the union to "concentrate public attention on the question that most vitally affects the men-the wages they shall receive and the hours they shall work."[31] Even staunch labor supporters like the "Labor Priest," Father Peter Yorke, advised the carmen that the time was "not propitious for a strike."[32] Ultimately, this dispute was submitted to an arbitration board consisting of Calhoun, William Mahon, president of the International Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees of America, and Oscar Strauss, a New York attorney. The arbitration decision, handed down on 9 November, stipulated no change in the ten-hour schedule. Wages were increased five percent, to 26 1/4 cents an hour, for employees with less than two years of service prior to 1 April 1903, and employees with more than two years of service prior to 1 April were granted a ten percent increase, to 27 1/2 cents an hour.[33] This award was called "unsatisfactory" by the Labor Clarion. The journal argued that Strauss was remiss in leaving the ten-hour day intact and that the wage increase was "probably the most obnoxious feature of the award-and that it would be received with dissatisfaction by the men must have been known to the arbitration board." The Labor Clarion said a similar wage increase proposal had been rejected by the union by "a vote of 1,100 to 11."[34] Although the union was dissatisfied with the award, a 1903 Census Office Bulletin reported that, in 1902, fewer than one percent of the conductors and motormen nationwide made more than $2.74 per day.[35]

Unhappy with the 1903 award, the carmen began negotiations for a new contract on 5 April 1904. They demanded a flat rate of 27 1/2 cents an hour. This demand was in response to their assertion that the United Railroads had circumvented the 1903 award by discharging experienced carmen and replacing them with "students" at a wage of 25 cents an hour. Negotiations broke down and the union threatened to strike, but the intercession of Mayor Schmitz successfully averted strike action, and, on 25 January 1905, the Carmen's Union signed a contract with the United Railroads agreeing to a graduated scale of wages, beginning at 25 cents an hour for new employees, increasing to 26 1/4 cents after one year and to 27 1/2 cents after two years of service. The agreement took effect on 1 May 1905 and extended until 1 May 1907.[36] It appeared that peace would reign for at least two years between the carmen and the United Railroads.

But on 18 April 1906 nature forcefully intruded on events in San Francisco. The great earthquake and fire destroyed a large segment of the downtown area and created havoc with the streetcar system. The disaster impacted thousands of San Francisco residents and directly affected both San Francisco politics and labor relations between the Carmen's Union and the United Railroads. Prior to the quake, the United Railroads had submitted a proposal for an overhead trolley system to the Board of Supervisors. On 21 May 1906, the Board approved the system, using the damage caused to the existing system by the earthquake as justification. The enthusiasm of the municipal leaders for the proposal was augmented by $200,000 in bribes paid by the United Railroads to the supervisors, Mayor Schmitz, and Schmitz's attorney, Abraham Ruef, for their approval of the proposal.[37] Opposition to this plan was widespread, focused on aesthetic issues, and led by the political gadfly Rudolph Spreckels, who, representing San Francisco reformers, was to play a significant part in the graft prosecution of 1906-07 which changed the face of San Francisco politics.[38]

The earthquake also resulted in exacerbating the carmen's frustration with their wages and hours, contributing to the dissatisfaction which caused the 1907 strike. On 18 August 1906, President Richard Cornelius and Secretary J.H. Bowling of the Carmen's Union wrote Thornwall Mullally, Patrick Calhoun's assistant. The letter proposed that the contract signed on 25 January 1905 be abrogated based on the exigent circumstances surrounding the earthquake, stating, "when we last bargained with you concerning hours and wages it was of course understood that we bargained for what was then usual work performed under usual conditions." The union accused the railroad of acting in bad faith following the earthquake and of attempting to increase its profits in the wake of the tragedy: "this union could not have foreseen the use you have been making of the disaster which befell San Francisco on that day." Since the railroad was not going to recognize the changed conditions by being "equitable without petition," the union submitted two proposals: the eight-hour day and the $3 daily wage. The carmen's increased workload, increased railroad profits, and the advance of rents and commodities which resulted in the "shrinkage of our wages when measured by the prices we must meet," were cited in support of the proposals.[39] The railroad responded by telling the union that "they must observe the terms of the contract which they had signed 25 January 1905, and which they had agreed to extend to 1 May 1907."[40]

The union voted to strike on 26 August 1906. On 1 September the San Francisco Chronicle reported "1200 . . . strikebreakers bound for San Francisco," noting that the strikebreakers were "as hard a looking lot of men as is seen in most prisons."[41] Once these men reached San Francisco, they were housed in the "fortified, provisioned streetcar barns" in anticipation of their strikebreaking activities. Mayor Schmitz then intervened, again refusing Calhoun's request for a police detail to protect his strikebreakers. Schmitz's intercession resulted in Calhoun's agreement to "submit the question of hours and wages to arbitration on the condition that the strikers would return to work immediately." Despite Schmitz's efforts, the streetcarmen resented his intercession because of "their suspicion that he had taken a bribe from the United Railroads Company in return for the grant of the overhead trolley franchise."[42] On 29 October 1906, the dispute was submitted to a board of arbitration.

A development in Oakland must have aggravated the Carmen's frustration. On 13 September 1906, the Oakland Enquirer reported that the Oakland Traction and Key Route streetcar companies had voluntarily raised the wages of their motormen, conductors, and gatemen by 3 cents an hour. The increase raised the pay of those workers to 28 cents an hour for the first year, 29 cents for the second year, and 30 cents for the third year of their employment. The statement by President E.A. Heron must have been of special interest to the members of the Carmen's Union. He reportedly said:

Although we have an understanding with you that the present scale of wages shall remain in force until January 1st 1907, the directors are of the opinion that owing to the increase of rents and additional work, some increase of wages should be allowed. . . . I desire to take this occasion to thank you on behalf of the company for the satisfactory manner in which you have performed your duty, and to express the hope that our future relations will continue to be as satisfactory.[43]

Since the Oakland companies did precisely what the San Francisco streetcarmen had hoped Calhoun would do after the earthquake, the San Francisco carmen could not help but notice the wage increases in Oakland. Whether the motivation behind the Oakland increases was the desire to avoid possible labor difficulties or to reward their employees based on significantly altered working conditions, the Oakland streetcar companies demonstrated that they wanted labor peace on their roads. Patrick Calhoun did not share their philosophy.

The arbitration award handed down on 28 February 1907 resulted in another wage increase for the members of the Carmen's Union. The carmen received 31 cents an hour for first-year men, 32 cents after one year, and 33 cents after two years. The ten-hour day, however, remained intact, and the carmen were again dissatisfied with the terms of the award, which expired after only two months, on 1 May 1907.[44]

In April 1907 the Carmen's Union began negotiations for a new contract. The union's demands were reported by the Chronicle as an either/or proposal: either a wage scale of 31 to 40 cents an hour or an eight-hour day at $3 per day.[45] The proposed graduated wage scale was called the "Oakland scale," as the Oakland carmen had received another wage advance after the September 1906 increase, giving them between 30 and 40 cents an hour, depending on their length of service. The one-cent wage difference at the bottom of the scale (31 cents for San Francisco carmen compared to 30 cents for the Oakland workers) reflected the San Francisco union's desire to avoid pay cuts for their members.[46] Calhoun refused to grant either the Oakland scale or the eight-hour day. On 5 May the Carmen's Union voted to strike.

The San Francisco political situation had changed dramatically between the earthquake and the beginning of the streetcar strike. During the winter of 1905-06, Rudolph Spreckels, one of the city's wealthiest residents, had forged an alliance with Fremont Older, the editor of the San Francisco Bulletin. The two men were dedicated to ridding the city of the corrupt government led by Schmitz. Spreckels financed hiring the famous detective, William J. Burns, and shortly after the 1906 quake a group of investigators began working to uncover evidence of Schmitz's corruption. The investiga-tion was successful; on 16 November 1906, Schmitz was indicted for extortion. The investigators then discovered evidence that sixteen members of the Board of Supervisors had taken bribes. All sixteen confessed, were granted immunity from prosecution, and, on 18 March 1907, told their story to a San Francisco grand jury.[47]

The graft investigations effectively eliminated any political influence the mayor or the supervisors retained in San Francisco and represented a major blow to organized labor in the city. The Labor Clarion expressed its feelings of betrayal in an article entitled "Supervisors, If You Are Guilty, Resign Forthwith." The article excoriated the supervisors for their corruption, saying, without exception, every man and woman in San Francisco who is affiliated with a Labor Union earnestly hoped that the men holding Union cards who had been elected municipal officials would at least serve his term without giving opportunity to even his bitterest enemy to attack his integrity.
Have our hopes in this respect been realized? The answer comes from the country over, and it is NO![48]

With the mayor under indictment and the potential influence of the supervisors eliminated, the Carmen's Union now had to battle the United Railroads without the help of anyone in the municipal government.

Richard Cornelius of the Carmen's Union, Michael Casey of the Teamster's Union, Andrew Furuseth of the Sailors' Union of the Pacific, and Father Peter Yorke all opposed a strike at this time and tried vainly to persuade the carmen to reconsider.[49] Cornelius stated his position explicitly at a 1 May meeting when he told the assembled union members, "You are all acting like crazy fools. . . . I warn you to take care and do nothing rash." His warning was greeted by hisses from the union rank-and-file.[50]

The strike that no San Francisco labor leader seemed to want began on 5 May 1907. Calhoun had prepared well for the strike. On 4 May, he had contracted with James Farley, a professional strikebreaker, for four hundred men to operate the cars.[51] On Tuesday, 7 May 1907, bloody violence erupted when the company attempted to run streetcars with Farley's strikebreakers. In an exchange of gunfire between striking carmen and strikebreakers along Turk Street, one person was killed (another died later of his wounds) and at least twenty were injured.[52]

The strike was causing fractures in the community, fractures that were illustrated by the way the city's four main newspapers treated the events of "Bloody Tuesday." The Chronicle adhered to a conservative Republican philosophy, editorializing on 8 May, "We are informed that in such cases of violence as have occurred in the street car strike but few of the carmen were concerned. . . . for the most part the crowds were composed of ordinary hoodlums." In language that would have made Theodore Roosevelt proud, the editorial continued by saying that "It is of the highest importance that the reign of law be maintained. That is of far more consequence than the triumph of either party in an economic contest."[53] The basically pro-labor Examiner told Patrick Calhoun that "this city will not countenance the loosing of a gang of desperadoes to fire volleys into crowds." The daily also praised Mayor Schmitz for his request that the people of San Francisco "keep away from the centers of possible disturbance."[54] The two dailies controlled by reformers, John D. Spreckels' Call, and editor Fremont Older's Bulletin, held a different view of bloodshed and labor conflict. The Call, in two editorials, reminded the citizens of San Francisco that "It is time for public opinion to make itself understood and to procure its due weight in the adjustment of these unhappy and disastrous complications."[55] The following day, after a warning to both the Carmen's Union and the United Railroads to stop the violence, the paper decried the political state of affairs in San Francisco:

The fact that San Francisco is practically without a municipal government puts the duty the more strongly upon all citizens, whether they hire or are hired, to obey the law, to work together for the salvation of a city that needs it today more than any other city in the world.[56]

The Bulletin, under the control of its crusading editor, chose to bury the story of the bloodshed on page four of its 8 May issue, rather than treat it as the headline story. The paper made its position clear in an editorial the same day that blamed the city's officials, saying that "For yesterday's bloody battle in the streets Chief of Police Dinan is immediately responsible; and behind him, and equally guilty, stands Mayor Schmitz." Dinan was criticized for not attempting to disperse a crowd of "four or five thousand men and boys" at the car streetcar barn at Turk and Fillmore Streets. The daily claimed that "Dinan is aware that when a great strike is in progress, a certain lawless, turbulent element . . . delights in the opportunity to provoke riots." The Bulletin claimed that the crowd had gathered for "the purpose of attacking the cars, and the police well knew it." Chief Dinan, "acting under instructions from the Mayor, and disregarding the expressed wishes of the officers of the Carmen's Union, permitted the crowd to stand there." [57]

The events of "Bloody Tuesday" did not discourage the United Railroads from running the cars. Although the SFLC asked the citizens of San Francisco to boycott the streetcars, service resumed almost immediately after the strike's beginning. As quickly as service was resumed, feelings about the strike polarized along class lines. Streetcar patrons in San Francisco were largely middle- and upper-class residents-most of San Francisco's middle class lived in the Western Addition and Richmond districts, "neighborhoods [that] grew up as a direct consequence of streetcar access." The residents of these neighborhoods depended on the streetcars to transport them to their jobs, their shopping, and their entertainment.[58] On 10 May, the Chronicle reported on the movement of two cars, saying that the "moving of the cars [was] greeted by the better element with every manifestation of approval." The events of the previous two days included "well-directed shots fired by the guards on Tuesday and the healthy beating that the rabble received Wednesday."[59] Clearly, the "better element" favored the resumption of streetcar service, even to the detriment of the working-class "rabble."

The actions of San Francisco women were prominently featured during the early days of the strike. On 9 May the Chronicle reported women along the route of the streetcars cheering and waving at the strikebreakers.[60] The following day, the same paper described how a half-dozen pretty young girls employed in a nearby bakery and candy store came out, their arms filled with roses and carnations . . . the girls ran up to the cars as they came to a stop . . . and showered the flowers upon the non-union carmen, whose courage in coming out unarmed into the hostile rabble had excited the admiration of the maids.[61]

As if that description was not sufficiently evocative, the paper's next paragraph was an even more syrupy paean to the valor of the strikebreakers:

One of the girls, rather prettier than the rest, stepped timidly

toward the car and then back again. The other girls hastened to bolster her failing courage by remarks of encouragement. Then, blushing violently, she stepped close to the car, raised her arms, pursed her lips and looked longingly up at one of the carmen, natty looking in his new uniform. This gallant, slightly abashed himself, quickly divined the wish of the girl, and leaning hurriedly from the car, he touched her lips with his, amid the uproarious cheers of the crowd.[62]

It fair takes your breath away!

The other dailies also reported women riding the strikebreaker's cars. On 11 May, the Bulletin reported that "a woman braves [the] crowd to ride."[63] The same day, the Call's front page carried a picture of a smiling woman above the caption "ONE OF THE MANY FAIR SYMPATHIZERS OF THE STRIKE BREAKERS, WHO FILLED PORCHES AND WINDOWS IN THE RESIDENCE [sic] DISTRICT YESTERDAY, CHEERING THEM AND SHOWERING THEM WITH FLOWERS AS THEY PASSED."[64] On 14 May, the Bulletin showed a picture of women boarding a streetcar beneath a caption chiding men for their timidity. The caption read "[a] Photograph taken at the ferry depot this morning as the cars were being started out Market street. Many of the passengers are women, who, seemingly, have less fear than men about riding on the cars."[65]

On 14 May, the Chronicle re-emphasized the coarse nature of the strikers. Contrasting the egregious behavior of the "thugs" supporting the strike with the genteel nature of the female streetcar passengers the daily wrote:

These offenses were not to be compared, however, with the epithets

that were applied to women passengers by strikers and their sympathizers. The foulest names of the brothel, names that are mentioned even there in whispers, were loudly shouted by the strikers at women who boarded the cars, and who probably never heard such epithets before in their lives. To a man they were unbearably offensive, then what must they have been to a woman?[66]

Even the woman suffrage movement in San Francisco reflected the

class tensions illuminated by the boycott as "unionists involved in the suffrage movement became enraged when their reformist sisters ignored the plight of the Carmen's Union." Many of the mainstream suffragists spurned the boycott-"they simply did not want to walk."[67]

In counterpoint to their more well-to-do sisters, many working-class women were reported to be behaving like the strikers. On 13 May, women living at the earthquake refugee Richmond Camp "attacked streetcars with `missiles' and occupied the tracks with babies in their arms."[68] Support for the two opposing sides-as represented by support for the boycott-had divided along class lines. Class "influenced residential patterns and streetcar patronage and, therefore, determined support for the boycott."[69] As far as San Francisco's newspapers were concerned, the working-class carmen and their supporters occupied the role of villain in the dispute.

By the third week in May, the strike appeared headed for a protracted existence. The boycott requested by the SFLC seemed ineffective as the Examiner reported 40,000 riders on 14 May.[70] The following day, the Chronicle claimed that 50,000 persons rode on seven lines and that there were "few acts of hoodlumism throughout the day."[71] The Labor Clarion ignored the ominous signs during May that the streetcars were running, and focused instead on Patrick Calhoun's personal short-comings. The labor publication characterized him as a man whose "greed for gold is as insatiable as is his lust for power."[72] By the end of May, the union's position appeared quite precarious.

Organized labor's political situation continued to deteriorate. By the end of July the municipal government had passed into the hands of the graft prosecutors who represented the city's reform-ers.[73] On 25 May, Mayor Schmitz was indicted on sixteen counts of bribery in connection with the 1906 overhead trolley decision. Indictments were also returned against several prominent officials of the United Railroads, including Patrick Calhoun. On 13 June 1907, Schmitz was convicted of extortion and removed from the Mayor's office. This created a thoroughly chaotic political situa-tion. As the Chronicle pointed out, removing Schmitz from office put the city government "in the hands of the prosecution, acting through its private corps of confessed bribe takers [the sixteen supervisors]."[74] When the sixteen bribe-taking supervisors approved the graft prosecution's selec-tion of Edward Taylor as mayor and then resigned their offices in July, organized labor in San Francisco reached the nadir of its political influence. The new board-chosen by the graft prosecution and appointed by Taylor-was composed mainly of "business and professional men who had backed the 1905 fusion ticket," and included only two pro-labor members, Olaf Tveitmoe of the BTC and the editor of the Labor Clarion, Joseph O'Neil.[75] The new municipal government seemed "for the most part to be indifferent toward Calhoun's ruthless attempts to break the strike." In fact, the new municipal officials aided Calhoun's efforts substantially by "declaring that the police had no legal right to search Calhoun's men."[76] The significance of this restriction was obvious-the strikebreakers could arm themselves with impunity.

By mid-June, the position of the striking carmen was desperate: the streetcars

were running, and labor's political influence was gone from the municipal government. On 9 June 1907, representatives of the BTC, the SFLC, and the Carmen's Union met and agreed to "call on the labor organizations of this city to assess their members 50 cents and 25 cents per capita weekly to provide funds for the benefit of the unions now engaged in strikes."[77] In addition to agreement on an assessment of their members, representatives of the SFLC and the BTC agreed to provide ten men apiece to "meet and consult with the Strike Committee of the Street Carmen regarding the strike situation."[78] Two main subcommittees were formed, mixing the representatives of the three organizations in joint committees overseeing finance and transportation facilities. The serious nature of the situation was acknowledged by the Labor Clarion when it wrote that it was evident that every man present thoroughly realized the gravity of the existing industrial situation and was determined to devote his entire energy and ability to the task of circumventing the "union-smashers."[79]

The Labor Clarion had high hopes for the positive impact this coalition would have on the streetcar strike, and celebrated "the unanimity of action on the part of the Labor Council and Building Trades Council, and the harmony which has marked the proceedings of the committee from the outset."[80] Unfortunately for the Carmen's Union, this coalition was split by labor's continued participation in municipal politics.

The factional dissension between the SFLC and the BTC centered around BTC head Patrick McCarthy's mayoral ambitions, and the effect of the graft prosecution on municipal politics. Knight sees the BTC's support of the strike as "a result of P.H. McCarthy's political ambitions. . . . It gave him an auspicious opportunity to bid for labor votes."[81] When Mayor Schmitz was removed from office, McCarthy "determined to become the party's [Union Labor Party] candidate for mayor in the approaching November election."[82] This put the SFLC in an awkward position as it had "renounced all connections with the Union Labor Party" in March 1907; the Council had, at the same time, "endorsed the graft prosecution."[83] In July McCarthy endorsed the nomination of a new slate of ULP candidates, and the BTC "then captured the ULP apparatus and set it on an anti-prosecution course."[84] The following month, internecine squabbling between the SFLC and BTC was out in the open. Michael Casey of the Teamsters (affiliated with the SFLC) attempted to persuade the Council to support a slate of primary candidates pledged to continue the graft prosecution. In response, McCarthy threatened to withdraw the BTC's support of the streetcar strikers. The Labor Council then voted to table Casey's motion favoring the graft prosecution.[85]

The graft prosecutors also contributed to the factionalism. According to Bernard Cronin's study of Peter Yorke, despite the Taylor administration's apparent indifference to the strike, the "graft prosecutors, who were known to have control over the administration, urged the workingmen to vote for the incumbents."[86] The prosecutors "assured the workers that Calhoun would be sent to prison if they voted to keep the pro-prosecution administration in office."[87] Father Yorke saw clearly that labor's involvement in politics would be disastrous for the streetcar strikers. He advised workers "not to consider the continuation of the prosecution to be the main election issue."[88] Yorke saw the political situation as causing "division in the ranks of Labor, and possibly the loss of the carmen's strike."[89] Yorke pleaded for labor unity, warned the labor men against political involvement, and exhorted the streetcarmen to use "economic means to bring Calhoun to terms with the Carmen's Union."[90] Although labor leaders and striking workers ignored Yorke's admonition, the accuracy of his evaluation was apparent by mid-August.

McCarthy had secured the ULP nomination for mayor and union lawyer Frank McGowan had been nominated for District Attorney. McGowan promised to "withdraw immunity from the guilty supervisors, thereby eliminating them as friendly witnesses."[91] Thus, election of McGowan would threaten the graft prosecutions. At this point, the political situation in San Francisco degenerated into absurdity. Calhoun, still under indictment, apparently viewed the election of McGowan as a "possible escape from the `vengeance' of his enemies," and urged the "workingmen to vote the straight Union Labor ticket in the coming election."[92] Led by Casey, Labor Council members who had unsuccessfully attempted to nominate their own independent candidate supported the incumbent mayor, Taylor, and opposed McCarthy![93] Finally, during the campaign, ULP circulars that "appeared on strikebreaking United Railroad vehicles raised the suspicion that Calhoun was backing McCarthy."[94]

With the attention of many labor leaders focused on politics, the streetcar strikers found them-selves abandoned. A final act of violence occurred on Labor Day, 1 September 1907. In what the Chronicle described as a "vicious attack on men on the cars" by "5000 union rioters," one building trades worker was fatally shot and more than a dozen men were wounded.[95] On 12 September Carmen's President Cornelius and the joint strike committee lifted the boycott against the United Railroads-ostensibly to prove Calhoun's inability to provide adequate service. The following day, the Labor Clarion urged union members "to patronize the street cars as rapidly as possible."[96] Although the strike continued, lifting the boycott was a tacit admission that it was lost.

The strike effectively ended with the election of Edward Taylor as mayor on 5 November 1907. The following day, "a number of union carmen reported to the offices of the United Railroads, and asked to be reinstated in their jobs." They were, on "the condition that they would renounce their union."[97] On 26 November 1907, the Examiner reported that Calhoun had destroyed the union. The United Railroads president said that he would "never again recognize Cornelius or his union."[98] At a terrible cost, Calhoun had beaten the Carmen's Union and had turned the United Railroads into an open-shop employer. During the strike, 31 people had been killed (including 25 passengers) and more than 1100 had been injured (including approximately 900 passengers).[99]

The Carmen's Union was shattered. On 12 February 1909, C.A. Priest, Secretary of Local 205, advised the San Francisco Labor Council that "at the last meeting of the Executive Board of Div 205, of the Carmen's Union, it was decided to relinquish the charter of our old Division."[100]

The 1907 strike saw politics and labor-capital relations converge to create a violent labor dispute. The chaotic situation of municipal politics made a successful strike extremely unlikely, and the squabbling and political aspirations of labor leaders ensured its failure. The rank-and-file union members became little more than pawns in a struggle for control of San Francisco politics.

Existing historiography on the 1907 street railway strike is scant and focuses primarily on labor-capital relations and the fight to break the union. There are no secondary works devoted to the topic and the information available in works dedicated to other topics does not examine the politics surrounding the strike in any depth. However, labor and politics were intimately related in turn-of-the century San Francisco, and any attempt to understand the streetcar strike of 1907 without examining municipal and labor politics will produce an incomplete picture.

This essay is not offered as any type of definitive account of either the strike or San Francisco politics of the time. In order to obtain a more complete picture of this event, and to situate it in its historical context, a number of other themes need further study, among them the class divisions within San Francisco society. These divisions were a contributing factor to the political factionalism which ultimately destroyed the strike. The internal politics and factional splits between the SFLC and BTC also had an important bearing on the strike. The competition and animosity between the two groups created inequities among San Francisco wage earners, and the BTC exercised a great deal more power in the political arena. The inability of the two labor organizations to put aside their differences at a time of crisis and the resulting fragility of their alliance are clear indications of the depth of the animosity between them. All these elements significantly affected the strike. Another important theme, covered only by implication in this essay, is the strength of reform sentiment in San Francisco. This reform sentiment was the driving force behind the graft prosecution and, in typical Progressive Era style, was directed at the rampant corruption in the local govern-ment.[101] Yet another theme stems from Calhoun's clear victory over a labor union in a strongly union town. The repercussions of the labor defeat and the union's destruction must have had a significant ripple effect. Did it give impetus to a stronger anti-union effort in San Francisco?

Although he was the clear winner in 1907, Patrick Calhoun subsequently found

that victory had a bitter taste. In December 1909, as Kazin reports:

years of accidents on the United Railroads and popular disgust

with Calhoun's strikebreaking and bribe-giving ways finally turned the tide. San Franciscans authorized over $2 million worth of bonds to purchase and build the first publicly owned streetcar line in the nation.[102]

It was small consolation, to be sure, for the men of the Carmen's Union local 205.

Endnotes

1 Robert E.L. Knight, Industrial Relations in the San Francisco Bay Area, 1900-1918 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960), 371. Return to essay.

[2] According to Michael Kazin, the executive committee of the Union Labor Party (ULP) was organized in July 1901, and gained strength during the San Francisco general strike of July-October 1901. During the strike, Mayor James Phelan used the police as strikebreakers. Phelan's action angered the "white working-class communities and gave them [the ULP] a realistic expectation of victory." Indeed, "the overriding question of the 1901 campaign was the use of police to break strikes." Schmitz was an excellent choice as the party's first mayoral candidate. Kazin describes him as "tall [and] handsome," well-spoken, with a "German-Irish-Catholic ancestry [which] recommended him to a huge ethnic constituency." Michael Kazin, Barons of Labor: The San Francisco Building Trades and Union Power in the Progressive Era (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 56-57. Return to essay.

[3] See Kazin, 115; and Knight, 127. Return to essay.

[4] See Kazin, 118-19; Knight 163; Walton Bean, Boss Ruef's San Francisco: The Story of the Union Labor Party, Big Business, and the Graft Prosecution (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1952), 64-65. According to Bean, the magnitude of the ULP victory was "stunning." Schmitz collected 13,000 more votes than the runner-up in the race for mayor; William Langdon was elected district attorney by a nearly identical margin and each of the eighteen candidates for supervisor were elected by at least 6,000 votes. Return to essay.

5 Kazin, 13. Return to essay.

6 Melvyn Dubofsky, The State and Labor in Modern America (Chapel Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 49. Return to essay.

7 Report of the Proceedings of the Thirty-First Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor, Held at Atlanta, Georgia, November 13 to 25, Inclusive, 1911 (Washington D.C.: The Law Reporter Printing Company, 1911), 101. According to the AFL report, their membership increased from 264,825 in 1897 to 1,465,800 in 1903. Return to essay.

8 Dubofsky, 38. Return to essay.

9 Ibid., 40. In his work, Dubofsky makes it clear that Roosevelt's efforts to end the 1902 strike were not a result of pro-labor sentiments. Return to essay.

10 Ibid., 44. Return to essay.

11 Ibid., 45. Return to essay.

12 Ibid., 49. Return to essay.

13 Ibid. Return to essay.

14 See Ibid; and Robert W. Cherny, "The Democratic Party in the Era of William Jennings Bryan," in Democrats and the American Idea, ed. Peter B. Kovler (Washington D.C.: Center for National Policy Press, 1992), 187. The 1908 Presidential election campaign was important for the budding alliance between labor and the Democratic Party. After the party ran "to the right of the Republicans," with Alton B. Parker in 1904, William Jennings Bryan regained the party's Presidential nomination in 1908. Responding to "anti-union political initiative[s] from the National Association of Manufacturers, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) had become more involved in politics," and in 1908, "presented both parties with a set of proposals for labor legislation." The proposals were ignored by the Republicans but Bryan and the Democrats were "highly receptive to their suggestions." Even though the Democratic party platform included all the AFL had asked for-an eight-hour day for government workers, recognition of the right of workers to organize, changes in injunction laws, and a Cabinet level Department of Labor-the AFL, "in keeping with its commitment to nonpartisanship . . . did not make a formal endorsement." Return to essay.

15 Kazin, 3-4. Return to essay.

16 Ibid., 4. Return to essay.

17 Ibid., 277. Return to essay.

18 Ibid., 13. Return to essay.

19 Ibid. Return to essay.

20 Ibid., 14-15. Kazin argues that the San Francisco business community adopted a pragmatic approach toward labor relations. Local employers knew that "labor's aims were popular in the community; even when employers fought a particular union, they usually defended the principle of unionism itself." Since local capitalists "lacked the leverage of a national market and multiple production facilities that enabled companies like U.S. Steel to shut unions out of its plants until the 1930s," maintaining good relations with their employees was simply the most practical way of doing business. "For many small and medium-sized firms competing in a regional market, paying good wages and acquiescing to union rules made common sense." Ibid., 18-19. Return to essay.

21 Ibid., 14. Kazin describes San Francisco as being "relatively untouched by the `new immigration' from Southern and Eastern Europe" at this time. Although the city "had been dominated by Europeans and their children" since the Gold Rush, they "were overwhelmingly of British, Irish, German, and Scandinavian descent." Ibid, 19. According to the Census Office, San Francisco's 1900 population was 342,782. Of this total, 325,378, or 95 percent of the population, was classified as "White." Over 63 percent of San Francisco's foreign born population (74,045 out of 116,855) came from four areas: Scandinavia, Great Britain, Ireland, and Germany. Department of the Interior, Census Office. Census Reports Volume I: Population, Part I (Washington, D.C.: United States Census Office, 1901), 610, 800-03. Return to essay.

22 Knight, 371, 381-82. Knight argues that two attempts were made during the first decade of the twentieth century to unify the employers. He describes the Employer's Association of 1901 as an "ad hoc organization . . . not well staffed, nor widely representative of employers." The Citizen's Alliance of 1903 had ample time to build up and prepare "antiunion campaigns." The potential of the Citizen's Alliance was undermined by its choice of leadership. "Instead of entrusting its affairs to a local businessman with broad personal contacts and the respect of the community, it imported Herbert George, a professional promoter." George alienated many San Francisco employers by his "heavy-handed tactics, blustering public utterances, and unimpressive accomplishments." In contrast, "The Building Trades Council and the Labor Council gave the labor movement a type of leadership relatively palatable to the business community." The two councils ensured that "the labor movement remained under the control of men who fitted into the mold of the conservative AFL business unionist." Return to essay.

23 Kazin, 135. Return to essay.

24 John Mitchell, Organized Labor (Philadelphia: American Book and Bible House, 1903), 219. Mitchell was the president of the United Mine Workers of America, occupying that position during the 1902 strike mentioned earlier. Return to essay.

25 Coast Seamen's Journal, 23 October 1901, 1-2. Return to essay.

26 Kazin, 56-57; and Knight, 163. Return to essay.

27 Knight, 98-99. Return to essay.

28 Ray Stannard Baker, "A Corner in Labor, What's Happening in San Francisco Where Unionism Holds Undisputed Sway," quoted in Kazin, 13. Return to essay.

29 Coast Seamen's Journal, 7 May 1902, 1. Return to essay.

30 Knight, 120-21. Return to essay.

31 Labor Clarion, 3 April 1903, 5. Return to essay.

32 See The Leader, 28 March 1903, 4; and Bernard Cornelius Cronin, Father Yorke and the Labor Movement in San Francisco, 1900-1910 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1943), 139. Return to essay.

33 See Cronin, 141; and Labor Clarion, 13 November 1903, 1. Return to essay.

34 Labor Clarion, 13 November 1903, 1. Return to essay.

35 Census Office Bulletin 3: Street and Electric Railways in America in Two Centuries: An Inventory, the Arno Press Collection (New York: Arno Press, 1976), 13. According to Census Office figures, in 1902 only 336 of 64,281 platform men-less than one percent of all platform men nationwide-made more than $2.74 per day. Including platform men making between $2.50 and $2.74 per day, only 819, or fewer than 1.3 percent, made more than the platform men in San Francisco. Return to essay.

36 See Coast Seamen's Journal, 11 May 1904, 6; and Cronin, 140-41. Return to essay.

37 Knight, 183. Return to essay.

38 Cronin, 141-42. Return to essay.

39 R. Cornelius and J.H. Bowling to Thornwall Mullally, 18 August 1906, San Francisco Labor Council Collection, Carton 17, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. Return to essay.

40 Cronin, 143. Return to essay.

41 San Francisco Chronicle, 1 September 1906, 1. Return to essay.

42 Cronin, 144. Return to essay.

43 Oakland Enquirer, 13 September 1906, 1. Return to essay.

44 Cronin, 150. Return to essay.

45 San Francisco Chronicle, 1 May 1907, 1. Return to essay.

46 Labor Clarion, 3 May 1907, 1. Return to essay.

47 Knight, 181-82. Return to essay.

48 Labor Clarion, 22 March 1907, 1. Return to essay.

49 Cronin, 152-53. Return to essay.

50 San Francisco Chronicle, 2 May 1907, 2. Return to essay.

51 Cronin, 156. Return to essay.

52 See San Francisco Chronicle, 8 May 1907, 1; and San Francisco Examiner, May 8, 1907, 1; and San Francisco Call, 8 May 1907, 1; and San Francisco Bulletin, 8 May 1907, 4. The casualties during the strike were appalling. According to Robert Knight, 31 persons lost their lives during the dispute, with over 1,100 injured. Knight, 196. Return to essay.

53 San Francisco Chronicle, 8 May 1907, 6. Return to essay.

54 San Francisco Examiner, 8 May 1907, 22. Return to essay.

55 San Francisco Call, 8 May 1907, 8. Return to essay.

56 San Francisco Call, 9 May 1907, 8. Return to essay.

57 San Francisco Bulletin, 8 May 1907, 6. Return to essay.

58 Susan Englander, Class Coalition and Class Conflict in the California Woman Suffrage Movement, 1907-1912: The San Francisco Wage Earners' Suffrage League (Lewiston, New York and San Francisco: Mellen Research University Press, 1992), 87. Return to essay.

59 San Francisco Chronicle, 10 May, 1907, 1. Return to essay.

60 San Francisco Chronicle, 9 May 1907, 1. Return to essay.

61 San Francisco Chronicle, 10 May 1907, 1. Return to essay.

62 Ibid. Return to essay.

63 San Francisco Bulletin, 11 May 1907, 1. Return to essay.

64 San Francisco Call, 11 May 1907, 1. Return to essay.

65 San Francisco Bulletin, 14 May 1907, 1. Return to essay.

66 San Francisco Chronicle, 14 May 1907, 1. Return to essay.

67 Englander, 87. Return to essay.

68 San Francisco Examiner, 14 May 1907, 1. Interestingly, the Labor Clarion did little to encounter the picture presented by the city's dailies. On 17 May 1907, the publication barely mentioned "Bloody Tuesday," focusing instead on Calhoun's failure to "restore normal street car service." Labor Clarion, 1. Return to essay.

69 William Issel and Robert W. Cherny, San Francisco, 1865-1932: Politics, Power and Urban Development (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986), 58-66; quoted in Englander, 87. Return to essay.

70 San Francisco Examiner, 14 May 1907, 1. Return to essay.

71 San Francisco Chronicle, 15 May 1907, 1. Return to essay.

72 Labor Clarion, 31 May 1907, 2. Return to essay.

73 Cronin, 167. Return to essay.

74 San Francisco Chronicle, 14 June 1907, 6. Return to essay.

75 See Cronin, 167; and Kazin, 130. Return to essay.

76 Cronin, 168. Return to essay.

77 Labor Clarion, 14 June 1907, 1. At this time, the telephone operators were also on strike against the telephone company headed by Henry T. Scott. Return to essay.

78 Ibid. This twenty-six man committee was drawn from San Francisco's leading labor figures; Patrick McCarthy and Olaf Tveitmoe of the BTC, Michael Casey of the Teamsters, and Andrew Furuseth of the Sailors' Union were its most prominent labor members. Return to essay.

79 Ibid. Return to essay.

80 Ibid. Return to essay.

81 Knight, 194. Return to essay.

82 Ibid. Return to essay.

83 See Coast Seamen's Journal, 27 March 1907, 1; and Cronin, 169. Return to essay.

84 See Kazin, 136; and Cronin, 169. Return to essay.

85 San Francisco Bulletin, 14 August 1907, 1. Return to essay.

86 Cronin, 168. Return to essay.

87 Ibid. Return to essay.

88 Cronin, 168. Return to essay.

89 See The Leader, 6 July 1907, 6; and Cronin 168. Return to essay.

90 Ibid. Return to essay.

91 See Kazin, 138; and Cronin, 168-69. Return to essay.

92 Cronin, 170. Return to essay.

93 San Francisco Call, 17 August 1907, 1. Return to essay.

94 Kazin, 138. Return to essay.

95 San Francisco Chronicle, 2 September 1907, 2. Return to essay.

96 See San Francisco Chronicle, 13 September 1907, 1; and Labor Clarion, 13 September 1907, 1. Return to essay.

97 Cronin, 173. Return to essay.

98 San Francisco Examiner, 26 November 1907, 3. Return to essay.

99 Knight, 196. Return to essay.

100 C.A. Priest to A.J. Gallagher, 12 February 1909. San Francisco Labor Council Collection, Carton 17, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. Return to essay.

101 See Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Vintage Books, 1955), 5; and Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), 167; and Arthur S. Link and Richard L. McCormick, Progressivism (Arlington Heights, Illinois: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1983), 29. Municipal reform was an important component of the Progressive ideology. Hofstadter describes progressivism's general theme as "the effort to restore a type of economic individualism and political democracy that was widely believed to have existed earlier . . . and to have been destroyed by the great corporations and the corrupt political machine." Robert H. Wiebe argues that progressive reformers "described their opposition as a devilishly effective pact between bosses and businessmen which financed the machines and sold public favors on request." The reformers declared that they "would destroy that system and, by implication, substitute a natural, individualistic democracy." Arthur S. Link and Richard L. McCormick contend that "political progressivism originated in the cities-that businessmen and professionals "resented the corruption and inefficiency of the party machines," and that "This resentment had set off a wave of municipal reform campaigns on behalf of nonpartisan candidates who promised `honest, efficient, and businesslike' government." Return to essay.

102 Kazin, 191. Return to essay.